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Abstract.
In the 1980s a new, extraordinarily productive way of reasoning
about algorithms emerged. Though this type of reasoning has come
to dominate areas of data science, it has been under-discussed and its
impact under-appreciated. For example, it is the primary way we reason
about “black box” algorithms. In this paper we analyze its current use
(i.e., as “the common task framework”) and its limitations; we find a
large class of prediction-problems are inappropriate for this type of rea-
soning. Further, we find the common task framework does not provide a
foundation for the deployment of an algorithm in a real world situation.
Building off of its core features, we identify a class of problems where
this new form of reasoning can be used in deployment. We purposefully
develop a novel framework so both technical and non-technical people
can discuss and identify key features of their prediction problem and
whether or not it is suitable for this new kind of reasoning.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is exciting to witness the development of flexible, fast, and useful predic-
tive algorithms. Algorithms are driving cars, identifying breast cancers, enabling
globe-spanning businesses, and organizing unprecedented amounts of informa-
tion; prediction provides a strong foundation for technological innovation and
scientific breakthroughs Shmueli and Koppius (2011). The excitement about these
algorithms is warranted; these achievements are unparalleled in history. A very
natural question for members of the business, government, and academic commu-
nities is: “how can we use them?” This simple question is more complicated than
it first appears because modern predictive algorithms have several very distinc-
tive features, including this one: some of the most successful algorithms are so
complex that no person can describe the mathematical features of the algorithm
that gives rise to the high performance (a.k.a. “black box algorithms”). There is
an important tension right now because these extraordinary black-box algorithms
exist – with so much potential to do good – despite deep uncertainty about when
and how to use them. And this tension is warranted: for all of their achievements,
black-box algorithms have shown to be unpredictably brittle in the real world.
This is a consequence of how they are developed.
These algorithms have come into existence through a confluence of innovations.
Some of these innovations are practical (e.g., the price of computing has contin-
ued to drop), some are market-based (e.g., online platforms have proved to be
profitable business models and so corporations have funded much of this research
and development), some are due to political decisions (e.g., emphasis on STEM
fields has created a big pipeline of data scientists), but a major – yet also under-
appreciated – shift has come from a new framework for assessing algorithms, a
framework that does not require slow-moving mathematical proofs. While un-
derstanding black box algorithms is not possible, by understanding how they
are being developed and assessed we can understand what situations are more
– and less – compatible or safe for the use of black box algorithms. To provide
guidance on using prediction algorithms, this paper offers a new framework for
stakeholders (e.g., business people, government officials, non-statistically minded
academics) to discuss and critique the use of these algorithms. For reasons which
will become clear in section 2, we call this framework MARA(s).
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Below we give a short introduction to the intellectual-engine that has driven
much of the recent innovation, and the one that has consequences on how algo-
rithms are deployed.
The Common Task Framework (CTF) (Liberman, 2010; Donoho, 2017; Breiman,
2001) provides a fast, low-barriers-to-entry means for researchers to settle debates
about the relative utility of competing algorithms. This is in contrast to the tra-
ditional use of mathematical descriptions of the behavior of an algorithm, or
simulations of the algorithm’s ability to recover parameters of a data generat-
ing function. Many readers are likely familiar with the CTF even if the name is
unfamiliar; the NetFlix Prize (Bennett, Lanning and Others, 2007) and Kaggle
competitions are excellent examples of this framework. The key features of the
CTF are: (a) curated data that have been placed in a repository; (b) static data
(all analysts have access to the same data); (c) a well defined task (e.g., predict
y given a vector of inputs x for previously unobserved units of observation); (d)
consensus on the evaluation metric (e.g., the mean squared error of the predic-
tions from the algorithm on a set of observations); and (e) an evaluation data
set with observations which have not been accessible to the analysts. Today, in
practice, some of the features of the CTF are relaxed. In particular, outside of the
major competitions, feature “e” is often self-policed - i.e., the analyst has direct
access to the evaluation data set. When performed correctly, the CTF gives us a
way of justifying a claim that “Algorithm A performs better than Algorithm B.”
More than just a form of justification, the CTF provides an efficient environ-
ment for development. The data exist already. All analysts have access to these
common data so many people can work on the problem at the same time. Fast
computation takes the place of proving theorems, and performance is quickly
assessed using held-out data. The consequences of a poorly performing predic-
tion algorithm in the CTF are minimal - e.g., after a failure the analyst tweaks
the algorithm and tries again. Fundamentally, the CTF takes complex real-world
problems and sand-boxes them.
In the CTF, because there is a specific performance metric, there is little
ambiguity in the relative ordering of the algorithms conditional on a particular
dataset. The ordering gives rise to a ranking of the algorithms, and the public
display of these rankings are called ‘leader boards.” Leader boards are cited as
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using competition to motivate analysts to reach high levels of performance. The
underlying logic of using leader boards is new and productive. Leader boards rely
on a form of reasoning we call “outcome-reasoning” (discussed in detail in 4.1).
For the reasons described in the previous two paragraphs, outcome reasoning
– if appropriate – is preferred. However, many people are deploying black-box
algorithms, which rely on outcome-reasoning, in problem settings when outcome-
reasoning is unavailable. In these problem settings, “model-reasoning” should be
used. Many current debates in the literatures about the suitability of black box
models hinge on (mis)understandings about what kind of reasoning is appropriate
for given problems. The goal of this paper is not to resolve these debates but to
provide a useful framework for understanding the type of problem for which a
solution is sought.
In this paper, we make three fundamental shifts in focus from how current
debates about black box algorithms usually proceed. We make these shifts ex-
plicit here, to prevent reading this paper as contradicting existing decision-making
frameworks that analysts are already using to assess black box algorithms. Instead
of being in contradiction, the three shifts listed below indicate that our consider-
ations occur earlier in the data-driven decision-making pipeline than do existing
frameworks. The three shifts are 1) Our ontology starts with stakeholders defining
a prediction-problem. This means we think about how to elicit ideas and feed-
back from stakeholders. We work through several examples in Section 3, but we
call your attention to the example on recidivism in subsection 3.4. An immediate
implication of our ontology’s focus on stakeholders is that changes in stakeholder
membership is likely to change how we think about the prediction-problem. 2)
We focus on crafting the problem and its consequences. This means we are en-
gaging the problem quite early in the process - helping to understand, shape,
and quantify the key issues. We do not start after the “prediction task” already
exists; the task is not given to us. Like in experimental design, the stakeholders
must first think about what they want to accomplish by using data, and then we
help to turn that into a specification of the problem. 3) Our ontology focuses on
features of the problem, rather than features of the algorithm. Problem features
are a consequence of both real world constraints, and the interplay between those
constraints and stakeholders’ goals (see section 3 for detailed examples).
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We designed this paper to be accessible to different readers. Policy-minded
readers, scientists, and non-technical academics will find the information most
useful to them from sections 2 and 3. Analysts and technical academics who are
asked by colleagues to select appropriate algorithms will find sections 2, 4, and 5
provide useful context and language to guide these conversations. This modularity
leads to some slight repetition between sections, but even those in the algorithm
research and development communities will benefit from the reinforcement of key
concepts.
2. INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLED PREDICTION-PROBLEM
ONTOLOGY
In any interesting prediction problem, errors will occur. Viewed one way, the
Prediction-Problem Ontology is a framework for achieving buy-in from stakehold-
ers before these errors start to accumulate. Imagine for a moment that a black
box algorithm is shown to outperform all other existing algorithms in the train-
ing and test data. Based on this information alone, the algorithm is deployed.
After deployment a terrible event occurs due to errors in the predictions. Who is
accountable for the consequences of these errors? The reasoning that went into
the algorithm’s justification turned on knowledge owned by the analyst: Were
the training and test data sets adequate? Were the algorithms selected for con-
sideration adequate? Was the performance metric informative? Did the analyst
protect against over-fitting? These are technical questions. How could stakehold-
ers be held accountable if the algorithm cannot be interrogated by other means?
So who is accountable in this situation? The decision-making turned on trust in
the analyst’s judgment.
We can avoid this dynamic by including non-technical stakeholders in the
decision-making process. To do so we propose the Principled Prediction-Problem
Ontology, which extends the features of the Common Task Framework. We call
this framework MARA(s).
In MARA(s) we classify problems using four features (“problem-features”),
which we refer to collectively with the mnemonic “MARA”:
1. [measurement] ability to measure a function of individual predictions and
actual outcomes on future data,
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2. [adaptability] ability to adapt the algorithm on a useful timescale,
3. [resilience] tolerance for accumulated error in predictions, and
4. [agnosis] tolerance for potential incompatibility with stakeholder beliefs.
Stakeholders classify their problem as either “satisfying” or “not satisfying”
each problem-feature individually. (In some settings it may be more appropriate
to relax the binary classification.) If a problem satisfies the MARA problem-
features then the problem is suitable for outcome-reasoning – that is, the power-
ful form of reasoning that is the foundation for the CTF. If the problem fails to
satisfy even one of the features then the problem requires a more complex form of
reasoning to justify the algorithm’s deployment – i.e., model-reasoning (discussed
in detail in 4.1). In section 2.1, we extend the MARA acronym to MARA(s) to
emphasize the importance of stakeholder composition in deployment. Our frame-
work name, MARA(s), derives its name from the extended acronym.
Two dynamics contribute to this framework. First, MARA(s) extends the CTF
to “live” problems, providing a principled foundation for assessing the general-
izability and transportability of an algorithm into the real-world. Note that the
curation process that goes into creating a problem for use in the traditional CTF –
i.e., abstracting data sets from their applied example, providing labeled outcomes
of interest, and standardizing the task and performance metric – ensures satisfy-
ing the MARA problem features. Algorithms that are developed in the CTF can
be successfully applied to problems in the real world that similarly satisfy the
MARA problem-features. However, these algorithms may be unsuitable for de-
ployment in problems that do not satisfy the problem-features. Mara(s) provides
language to clarify a problem’s features and facilitate debate among stakeholders
about the suitability of an algorithm.
The second, and most fundamental, dynamic is that MARA(s) starts with the
stakeholders - that is, the people who are accountable to the performance of the
algorithm. Starting with stakeholders has two major implications: (a) the focus
of this assessment is based on understanding the problem itself rather than the
algorithm, and (b) if different stakeholders are brought in and out of the group
assessing the problem then the group can reach very different conclusions about
the appropriateness of a black box algorithm (see the recidivism example below
for how this works).
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Fig 1. Workflow
This framework implies a workflow (see Fig 1) in which stakeholders first en-
gage a prediction problem through MARA(s). This occurs prior to any technical
considerations (e.g., using cross validation to assess the fit of the algorithm).
Only after classification under MARA(s), analysts can identify suitable algo-
rithms that adhere to the proper form of algorithmic reasoning, and can assess
the potential algorithms for their technical merits. Finally the analyst can de-
ploy the algorithm with proper re-assessment, depending again on the class of
reasoning chosen through MARA(s).
2.1 Stakeholders
One of the fundamental tenets of MARA(s) is that it focuses energy in decision
making on the problem at hand. This forces the question of who is defining the
problem, or who is affected by the problem. These are the “stakeholders.” Until
this point, we have avoided specifying who the stakeholders are, as this depends
on the context of the scenario under which the problem is formulated. In this
subsection we spend a few paragraphs working through problems and focus on
who stakeholders might be. The notion of the stakeholder is quite flexible and
requires explicit consideration.
First, note that the definition of a stakeholder is contingent on several deci-
sions. For instance, a hospital considering the adoption of software to automate or
augment a task might very well consider the stakeholders to be the upper man-
agement who oversee the overall financial health of their institution. However,
they might also consider the doctors or nurses as stakeholders, who might bring
additional constraints to considerations of satisfaction of MARA. In some cases,
the hospital might wish to consider a hypothetical patient as a stakeholder, who
would in many scenarios impact how we think about the adaptability problem-
feature of MARA(s). MARA(s) does not prescribe who is a stakeholder. Rather,
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once stakeholders have been identified, MARA(s) aides in the discussion of the
merits of various algorithms.
Now consider how a business might define stakeholders in several ways. In
some scenarios, the stakeholders might be the C-suite, who are responsible for
the big decisions a company has to make. Alternatively, a business might engage
employees at any level, or even customers in understanding their problem’s satis-
fying of MARA constraints. And even the notion of customer may have different
interpretations here – current customers versus future customers– which may di-
verge in their interests. It’s likely that in many settings, in order to anticipate
more long-term consequences of their decisions, the company will need to include
shareholders as stakeholders.
While the term “stakeholder” might conjure a business application or commu-
nity mobilization, we intend for it to refer to a broad range of disciplines, includ-
ing academia. A scientist, for instance, should define stakeholders when engaging
MARA(s). In some cases, the stakeholder will be the scientist. In other cases, the
scientist might wish to include her peers as hypothetical stakeholders, perhaps
representing the pursuit of knowledge in a broad sense. In some cases it might
make sense for the scientist to consider journal editors as stakeholders. With an
eye towards getting published, the scientist might put more weight on the agnosis
problem-feature when considering editors as stakeholders, for instance, than she
otherwise might.
One of the most important examples of stakeholder involvement arises in gov-
ernment. Governing committees often seek involvement and input from a cross-
section of the population, with particular emphasis on those most impacted by
decisions. In large part, MARA(s) was developed with this kind of dynamic in
mind: bridging the communication-gap between non-technical stakeholders and
analysts. While stakeholders may benefit from the use of these algorithms, they
should not be required to understand the technical issues. With the appropriate
framework, stakeholders can offer useful critiques and assessments of the impor-
tant issues which can be incorporated into the design of the prediction-problem.
MARA(s) defines a framework for engaging decisions on deploying algorithms.
There are two levels to this debate. The first is on the scope of the stakeholders.
The second is on the satisfaction of MARA, given the stakeholders. While we
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anticipate a lot of time and emphasis to be placed on whether or not a problem-
feature is satisfied, it is usually most important to debate who should be included
as stakeholders as inclusion/exclusion will greatly impact the assessment of the
MARA problem-features.
The importance of the definition of the stakeholders motivates our extension
of the MARA acronym to MARA(s) in naming our framework. This extension
reminds the user that the definition of stakeholders is an important aspect of
our framework, while still keeping it separated from the MARA conditions by
way of the parenthetical enclosure. For readers familiar with function notation,
MARA(s) emphasizes that the satisfaction of MARA problem-features is a func-
tion of the stakeholder composition. While stakeholder selection is critical to
MARA(s), the framework is not designed to facilitate the selection process. We
hope that the process of stakeholder selection becomes an active area of thinking
across many interested domains, and that MARA(s) helps to clarify the critical
parameters of that debate.
We flag an important issue here: there can be deep ethical concerns about how
stakeholders are included and excluded. We do not engage these concerns in this
paper, but we do want to emphasize that we offer a language for critique: (i) “I
should have been a stakeholder when the problem was being defined.” (ii) “If I
had been a stakeholder then I would have argued that this problem fails both
adaptability and agnosis.” It is an important feature of this framework to provide
language that can express that different sets of stakeholders – e.g., s1 and s2 – will
have different assessments of satisfying the MARA: MARA(s1) 6= MARA(s2).
A different theory is needed to think about how we should go about including
and excluding stakeholders.
3. EXAMPLES
In this section we discuss several common prediction problems. Each exam-
ple was chosen to highlight different aspects of MARA(s). Each of the MARA
problem-features is considered, as well as how stakeholder selection impacts these
considerations.
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3.1 Recommendation systems
The goal of a recommendation system is to introduce users to products of
interest. Training data for a recommendation system often is represented as a
sparse matrix with individuals on the rows and products on the columns. If the
ith user has engaged with the jth product and rated it, the ij entry of the matrix
will contain the user-product rating. Other entries will be blank. To select algo-
rithms, some of the known entries are obscured, and the task is to predict the
rating for those user-product pairs. In deployment, algorithmic performance can
be measured as a function of the individual outcome of each recommendation,
which might take the form of a) acceptance of recommendation with a subsequent
high rating, b) acceptance with a low rating, c) acknowledgement of the recom-
mendation without taking it, or d) no acknowledgement of the recommendation.
Technically, only some of the predictions are verified in the wild. When the system
predicts that the user will assign a low rating to a product, that product will not
be recommended, and that rating might not be verified. But the ultimate goal of
the recommendation system is to provide good recommendations to make money.
Often there is a large pool of products, many of which could be recommended to
the user with great success. The loss function, then, is asymmetric. If a product is
recommended to a user, it is desirable that the product will obtain a high rating.
On the other hand, if a product that would otherwise have been enjoyed by a
user is not recommended, because of the large pool of potential products, missing
this product is not such a big deal. In general, recommendation systems satisfy
the MARA problem-features, though specific examples could be constructed in
which some of the problem-features might fail to be satisfied.
3.2 Financial trading
Consider a high-frequency trading group with large reserves and a goal of profit
maximizing. In order to construct a risk-diversified portfolio, one sub-goal in
high frequency trading is to predict the instantaneous covariance between stocks.
While one cannot directly assess the accuracy of the covariance prediction, one
could use an external measure of performance as a direct consequence of the
prediction to monitor the success of the algorithm. For example, the group can
monitor if the ongoing use of the algorithm increases the value of their holdings.
In this setting, all four problem-features are satisfied.
MARA(S) 11
In contrast, a manager of family wealth may require an algorithm that can be
evaluated by the family so that they can assess whether or not the algorithm’s
anticipated behavior matches their beliefs about the market or to verify that
the trading algorithm comports with their ethical concerns. In this case, agnosis
would not be satisfied.
3.3 Prediction in lieu of measurement
An interesting application of prediction algorithms is to use them as cheap
measurements in lieu of obtaining expensive, gold-standard labels. Consider an
automated system for triaging mild health symptoms. Instead of using a tele-
phonic nurse-based system, automated prediction algorithms could be used to
offer some level of diagnosis and either recommend a patient seeks further help
or not. From the perspective of a health care administrator, triaging mild health
symptoms may satisfy all four problem-features because the administrator con-
siders outcomes of many patients who interact with the health system. But if
administrators take as their goal the delivery of care to a particular patient then
the problem fails measurement because the prediction is explicitly deployed in
lieu of an actual diagnosis. That is, the point of such a prediction algorithm is to
skip the burden of obtaining the desired measurement.
Importantly, if the patient is included as a stakeholder, then the adaptability
problem-feature is also violated since this is a one-shot prediction for this pa-
tient. This is a general principle: problem-feature satisfaction depends on who is
considered as a stakeholder. That is, in general, MARA(si) 6= MARA(sj).
3.4 Recidivism
In an algorithm is used to predict recidivism, if all defendants with a score
above a certain threshold are incarcerated then we are unable to observe the
correctness of our predictions for people who are incarcerated. This arises from
a missingness in the outcome, and will happen in general when the prediction
algorithm causes changes in the outcome. The recidivism problem also violates
the resilience and agnosis problem-features. In the resilience problem-feature,
the debate hinges on the stakeholders’ concerns about depriving rights through
unnecessary incarceration, balanced against possible future criminal acts. Failure
to satisfy agnosis stems from two concerns. First, it is necessary to explain to
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the defendant why the decision to incarcerate was made. Second, even if the
algorithm were a flawless predictor, if it did so through morally repugnant means
then stakeholders would need to know that it is achieving its predictions this
way and these means would need to be debated by stakeholders (these kinds of
concerns are often referred to as “deontological” – roughly: having to do with
ethical considerations about the actions taken rather than just concerns about
the outcomes achieved).
3.5 Optimizing causal predictions
Suppose we run a website that can place only one of three ads – corresponding
to one of three items for purchase – for each customer who arrives to the website.
We are unsure of which ad to place for a given customer. Let us consider if a
black box algorithm is suitable for use in learning an optimal assignment of ads.
In this setting, a useful algorithm estimates how much the probability of buying
a product changes if the website shows a certain ad to a particular customer. At
first pass it may seem best to assign customers to the ad that will increase their
probability of purchase the most – but that is true only if the analyst knows
how the probabilities of purchasing change given an ad, up to some tolerance.
The prediction problem is thus to learn these probabilities and the question is
whether or not this is a suitable problem for outcome reasoning.
Similar to the recidivism example above, for any particular person we can only
measure the outcome for one of the ad placements. It is possible, though, to
target a useful function of these outcomes: the average outcome after exposure
to the ad placement conditional on some set of covariates (this is often referred
to as the conditional average treatment effect and can often be used to build
up other popular estimands). This can be done by having the algorithm assign
the ad placements in such a way that for any person there is some chance of
seeing each ad - i.e., 0 < p1, p2, p3 < 1. This is how randomized trials obtain
causal estimates. In contrast to a uniform randomized controlled trial – where
the assignment to treatment is proportional to rolling a die with three equally
weighted outcomes – in this setting we can use some more sophisticated algorithm
that may be able to obtain better estimates of the probabilities more efficiently.
This kind of thinking has led to interesting work on contextual bandit theory,
and other forms of adaptive trials.
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In most randomized controlled trials (RCTs), the goal is to assess the compat-
ibility of beliefs with reality, thus traditional RCTs fail agnosis. When humans
are the subjects in RCTs, issues related to resilience are considered by the insti-
tutional review board. But when the MARA problem-features are satisfied, this
gives rise to a peculiar problem type: an atheoretic randomized controlled trial
with treatment assignment determined by a black box algorithm.
4. REASONING ABOUT ALGORITHMS
In this section we describe the types of reasoning that can be used for assessing
an algorithm.
4.1 Model- and Outcome-reasoning
MARA(s) concentrates on the degree to which beliefs, or the current state of
knowledge in the given domain, are used to constrain a model. While content
knowledge is rarely ignored entirely, its utilization in assessment can vary from
heuristically informing the choice of method to actively validating the learned
parameters. We now introduce two forms of assessment that reside on either end
of this spectrum: model-reasoning and outcome-reasoning.
Model-reasoning requires checking that the model conforms to current beliefs.
For example consider a linear regression; we can use model-reasoning by verifying
the direction of individual coefficients matches what is expected from our domain
knowledge. We can think of these checks as a mapping from the model, or “pa-
rameters” of the model, to the space of current beliefs. In model-reasoning, it is
therefore possible to hypothesize how a particular instantiation of a model, fˆ , will
perform on future data without reference to the data used to fit the algorithm.
This provides solid ground on which experts in a field can debate and discuss
the fitted algorithm and its suitability for future predictions in a concise man-
ner, with discussions stemming from beliefs, and not potential difficult-to-find
shortcomings of the data set or algorithm.
In contrast, outcome-reasoning relies very little on beliefs, which primarily
enter into consideration through choice of the performance metric. Outcome-
reasoning is the reasoning used in the CTF. In MARA(s), outcome-reasoning is
extended to the ongoing, out-of-sample prediction setting. If the four problem-
features are satisfied then the analyst and stakeholders can monitor the perfor-
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mance metric during the deployment phase in order to assess whether or not their
algorithm is working.
The two types of reasoning lead to two different kinds of thinking when com-
paring algorithms. Model-reasoning tends to involve discussions of parameters
and the algorithm’s ability to faithfully recover the parameters. That is, model-
reasoning forces the analyst to think carefully about how changes in the covariates
should be linked to variation in the outcome (e.g., should we predict that a taller
person weights more than a shorter person?). But when divergent algorithms
are compared – e.g., say an ARMA(p,q) is compared to a decision tree – it is
quite challenging to translate between different conceptualizations of how the
input space is linked to the outcome space. Consequently, given the challenge
of translating between algorithms using model-reasoning, comparisons tend to
be pairwise and slow. In stark contrast, outcome-reasoning assiduously avoids
any debates in the input space. Instead, outcome-reasoning operates in the space
of the outcome – where all candidate algorithms must operate. An analogy to
capture this dynamic: consider two economies. Model-reasoning is a bit like a
barter-based economy; each transaction requires careful consideration of idiosyn-
cratic features and how much the parties need each of the products. An economy
that uses currency to store value allows a lower friction form of transactions;
each product’s value is translated into the currency and then comparisons can be
made rapidly between different products. Now imagine these two economies and
their ability to develop, innovate, and scale.
Many, though not all, concerns about black box algorithms can be framed as
issues of extrapolation. While the CTF offers a foundation for comparing algo-
rithms’ performance on currently available data, the CTF alone does not offer a
principled foundation for reasoning about the future, out-of-sample performance
of an algorithm. Without access to model-reasoning, the mechanisms for reason-
ing through performance on future data, and not just held-out data, are limited.
Such reasoning would require careful consideration of the interaction between
properties of the data set and the properties of the algorithm. In a setting that
uses a black box algorithm that requires massive training data, understanding the
data itself can be impossible. Even under a smaller data regime, the task of un-
packing the data/algorithm interaction can be difficult, if not impossible. Indeed
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one common fix when a black box fails is to add data to the training data set in
hopes that a new fit on the new data might remedy the failure. The underlying
cause for the failure with respect to the current fˆ often remains unknown.
An important distinction between the two modes of reasoning: model-reasoning
allows for detailed debate to happen before the deployment of the algorithm,
whereas outcome-reasoning affords assessment purely post-deployment.
4.2 The Ontology
We now discuss the four problem-features in more detail. Collectively, we refer
to the four problem-features as MARA.
4.2.1 Problem-feature 1: measurement The first problem-feature is the ability
to measure a function of the predictions and actual outcomes on future data.
Let y∗ be the value of a future outcome associated with predictors x∗, and fˆ(x)
denote the estimated prediction function. For some agreed-upon notion of close,
this problem-feature describes the ability to track whether fˆ(x∗) is close to y∗,
measured as g(y∗, fˆ(x∗)), within some reasonable tolerance.
This is the most foundational problem-feature for the MARA(s) framework.
If this problem-feature isn’t satisfied the analyst will not be able to verify if the
algorithm is performing well. The use of a black box model for a problem that
doesn’t satisfy measurement requires faith. If this problem-feature is satisfied
then the algorithm’s performance can be monitored after deployment by mon-
itoring the error function g() (notably, both Google (Google, 2019) and Uber
(Hermann et al., 2018) include monitoring predictions after algorithm deploy-
ment as a critical component of their machine learning workflows). Without this
feedback mechanism, assessment must happen before deployment. In this case,
our framework requires that the analyst pursue model-reasoning.
4.2.2 Problem-feature 2: adaptability Problem-feature 2 is the ability to adapt
the algorithm on a useful timescale. In some settings, upon discovering errors in
prediction, an algorithm can be updated quickly and will be presented with suf-
ficient opportunity to update. In other settings, the underlying dynamics of the
population of interest change at a rate such that those changes dominate algo-
rithm adaptations from observed error. The latter situation renders predictions
as one-shot extrapolations, at which point the observation of the function g() is
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useless.
For instance, predicting the outcome of the United States presidential election
depends on measuring the ebb and flow of priorities of the voting population.
With an algorithm assessed under outcome-reasoning, the lessons learned from
prediction errors in one election may not be informative for the next election
because the underling priorities of the population may have shifted. Another
common violation of adaptability is when the deployment of the algorithm it-
self changes the way the outcomes are generated; this phenomenon has been
described many times in policy settings - the Lucas Critique, Goodhart’s law,
and Campbell’s law being famous formulations.
4.2.3 Problem-feature 3: resilience Problem-feature 3 describes the stakehold-
ers’ tolerance for accumulated error in predictions. As errors accumulate, someone
or some group will be held accountable. Some stakeholders will see errors in pre-
diction as so intolerable as to bar any unjustified use of an algorithm, for example
when an error in prediction may lead to a death or a false incarceration. On the
other end, settings like recommendation algorithms may be viewed as having min-
imal consequences to errors in prediction. Most scenarios will be somewhere in
between, where the stakeholders are willing to trade off some unaccounted error
in predictions against the accumulation of value gained from better predictions.
If the group deploying the algorithm has large reserves relative to the accumula-
tion of costs due to the accumulation of errors then the problem at hand satisfies
resilience.
4.2.4 Problem-feature 4: agnosis Problem-feature 4 describes tolerance for in-
compatibility with stakeholder beliefs. Stakeholders will hold certain beliefs about
the process being predicted. These beliefs may take the form of prior knowledge
or scientific evidence (e.g., experience with how gravity works in this setting).
Other beliefs may arise from moral or ethical concerns (e.g., racial information
should not be used to assign credit scores). In some cases, if an algorithm reaches
its predictions in a way that violates their beliefs then this dynamic can make
stakeholders uncomfortable with deploying the algorithm.
The agnosis problem-feature requires both eliciting and clarifying the stake-
holders’ beliefs about the problem. Understanding agnosis also requires the ana-
lyst and stakeholders to gauge comfort with the algorithm violating their beliefs.
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4.3 Problem-feature discussion
In Section 3 we took great care to isolate examples so that each problem-feature
appeared as clear and distinct as possible. In reality, these features interact and
in practice should be discussed collectively as MARA. We encourage the use
of “MARA(s)” to emphasize the role of the stakeholders in assessing the four
problem features.
Model-reasoning requires deductive reasoning, meaning that we understand
the mathematical structures of the model well enough so that once decoupled
from the data it was fit on, stakeholders can reason about future behavior of
the algorithm. Methods of assessing an algorithm that are inductive cannot be
used for model-reasoning. Inductive reasoning is contingent and depends on the
data in hand (e.g. recycled predictions) or on details of hypothesized, future,
out-of-sample data. Methods of assessment built off of these are attempting to
approximate model-reasoning.
5. THINKING IN TERMS OF “OUTCOME-REASONING” INSTEAD OF
“BLACK BOX ALGORITHMS”
5.1 Outcome-reasoning as a connection between black boxes
In this section we have a more detailed discussion of what we mean by “black
box” algorithms. The classification laid out in Burrell is quite useful for discussing
how an algorithm becomes opaque: [Type 1:] opacity as intentional corporate or
state secrecy, [Type 2:] opacity as technical illiteracy, and [Type 3:] an opacity
that arises from the characteristics of machine learning algorithms and the scale
required to apply them usefully. The root-causes of the opacity are interesting,
and have implications for how to remove the opacity. Important research focuses
on how to reduce the opacity of the algorithms without losing the strengths
offered by these algorithms. Instead of focusing on the causes of the opacity, we
focus on how one goes about convincing others that the black box algorithm is
suitable for deployment.
For the sake of argument, consider an algorithm that satisfies all three defi-
nitions of black boxes as offered by Burrell. Taking this as our example, what
do we mean when we say this algorithm “works well”? Few understand how this
complex algorithm is implemented, and none argue the behavior of the algorithm
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is well-understood. So describing its behavior is not an option; we cannot use
model-reasoning. It appears that outcome-reasoning is the dominant way to rea-
son about the performance of this kind of algorithm. People believe this complex
algorithm works not because they believe the algorithm should work for some
problem because of how the algorithm functions, but rather because people have
observed these algorithms working – in a CTF-sense – by out performing other
algorithms on predictions tasks. If these algorithms are not justified by outcome-
reasoning then what argument, based on data, is used to justify these algorithms?
While there are three distinct causes of black boxes, recognize that regardless
of type we justify a black box by using outcome-reasoning. While the CTF was
first developed to address the development of Type 3 black boxes, the logic of
outcome-reasoning has been co-opted to justify the other types of black boxes.
With outcome-reasoning, organizations can try to convince stakeholders to use
their algorithm while withholding details of how their Type 1 black box works.
Without outcome-reasoning it is possible fewer Type 1 black boxes would be de-
ployed, because it would be harder for corporations and state actors to convince
stakeholders to accept the algorithm’s utility without allowing a deeper inter-
rogation of their algorithm (i.e., blocking any chance for model-reasoning). It is
interesting to think about how outcome-reasoning has facilitated the proliferation
of Type 2 black boxes – e.g., by lowering the barriers to assessing an algorithm
and therefore lulling more stakeholders into feeling comfortable deploying these
algorithms.
Outcome-reasoning does not require as detailed engagement with the behavior
of an algorithm, so more people can reason about the relative performance of
algorithms than if they were required to use model-reasoning. It is possible that
outcome-reasoning has led to overconfidence from non-technical stakeholders as
outcome-reasoning feels more accessible than model-reasoning.
5.2 MARA(s) clarifies the burden of black boxes
In this section we try to clarify a miscommunication happening in debates
about black box algorithms. We will motivate this example focusing on Type 3
black boxes, but the arguments need to be only slightly adapted in order to hold
for Type 1 and 2 black boxes. To orient the discussion we look at the following
question twice: “What happens if a black box algorithm fails?”
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First, in a technical sense, what happens if a Type 3 black box algorithm is
deployed in the real world and something goes wrong? Speaking loosely, there
are four fixes that are commonly used to correct an algorithm that is not well
understood: 1) add a human to the loop; 2) collect more data and retrain the
algorithm; 3) use a different algorithm; or 4) force the algorithm to return a pre-
specified output for inputs that have been identified as producing “unacceptably
bad” outputs. All four fixes might work, though they could be difficult to im-
plement (fix 1) or impossible to validate (fixes 2-4). In the paragraph below we
discuss each fix and their limitations.
The first fix is to add a human into the prediction process. For example, suppose
an airplane’s autopilot algorithm malfunctions under conditions that analysts are
unable to describe a priori. While the algorithm can successfully pilot most of the
time, an override can allow an alert pilot to take the controls when she detects an
error, thereby inhibiting the autopilot algorithm. With the human in the loop fix,
there is a fundamental loss of scalability which has been a hallmark of modern
prediction. The second fix uses more training data, especially in areas of input
space that the analyst believes to be problematic; however it is difficult to reason
about how to sample from the space of observations. From the perspective of a
black box algorithm, it is not clear if two points are “close or “far apart” in the
input space – these algorithms take advantage of non-linear patterns in the space
of inputs. For example, suppose we have two people one who is 36 years old and
another person is 36.1 years old. If we were working with an algorithm that uses
smooth change in the covariate space to change its prediction then these two
points might be seen to be “near” to each other and the algorithm would tend
to return quite similar predictions, but there is no such guarantee of smoothness
with a black box algorithm. Metaphorically, the black box algorithm “thinks”
differently about changes in the covariate space than more accessible models, so it
is hard for an analyst to think about how to get “useful” or “novel” or “divergent”
data to use to retrain the black box algorithm. The third fix restarts the original
search for an appropriate algorithm. As with the previous fix, it is impossible
to say that the original failure is corrected (without deploying the algorithm
and waiting to see if it fails again), and it is possible that new failures have
been introduced. The fourth fix is a special case of the third fix, creating a hard
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patch wherein the analyst forces the algorithm to return an analyst-determined
prediction in parts of the input space which are most problematic. For instance,
if an image labeler pairs otherwise innocuous labels and images in a way that is
objectionable, then the analyst may force the algorithm to return a non-response
whenever that input is paired with that label. We reiterate that, despite these
limitations, these four fixes may be appropriate for specific circumstances. In
other cases, these limitations may present insurmountable objections, rendering
these fixes useless.
Let us return to the orienting question: “What happens if a black box algorithm
fails?” Miscommunication appears in the literature because this question is used
differently by different people in order to highlight different types of concerns.
Inside of data analyst communities, the current decision-making frameworks and
conversations about improving prediction have understood this question in the
technical ways outlined in the two paragraphs above. But the question should
also be understood as asking: “How will responsibility be assigned?” There is
real value to be gained from deploying complex algorithms in the real world but
how can non-technical stakeholders be made part of the decision-making pro-
cess for deployment? If we do not offer a meaningful framework for non-technical
stakeholders to interrogate the suitability of an algorithm for deployment then
the entire burden is on the analyst. Our community’s work on impressive statisti-
cal technologies has outpaced our work on means for including our non-technical
collaborators at vital points in the development and deployment of these algo-
rithms.
This paper is motivated by the “How will responsibility be assigned?” style of
questions.
6. USING MARA(S) TO REASON ABOUT A RECIDIVISM ALGORITHM
In this section, we work through an example and focus on how MARA makes
reasoning about a prediction problem clearer. Consider an example where a par-
ticular county-court wants to have a decision support tool to quantify the poten-
tial for recidivism. (Note: it is not clear to us that a decision support tool in this
setting is a wise decision. But this is a scenario that has occurred, and it can be
framed as a prediction.) The Court announces its interest and requests proposals
from companies to create a decision support tool. Several hundred companies bid
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on the contract.
Recognizing that this can be thought of as a prediction problem, the Court
provides a data set to the companies and then holds a contest using the Common
Task Framework. The Court can thus rank the performance of the algorithms
using their desired metric(s). The three top performers are kept and move on
to a new round of consideration. The results of the competition were as follows:
Company A used a fantastically complex algorithm and out-performed the other
algorithms in the contest. Company B, which performed a noticeably less success-
fully compared to Company A, used a proprietary algorithm that Company B
believes should not be shared publicly (perhaps because they are concerned about
people exploiting weakness of the algorithm). Company C, which placed third in
the competition, uses an algorithm that is based on linear regression and they are
willing to share it publicly. Because of its best-in-competition performance (and
perhaps given other considerations such as speed and cost) the Court decides to
move forward with Company A.
Given the MARA(s) framework, it should be recognizable that the data-driven
part of the selection process above was based on outcome-reasoning, which may
or may not be a good way to cut down the pool of competitors according to
how stakeholders think about the MARA features. MARA(s) gives language to
stakeholders (particularly non-technical stakeholders) to criticize the process as
described above. The way we’ve told the story so far, it is not clear who selected
the data set used for the competition and selected the prediction task(s) and
performance metric. Even in using outcome-reasoning, there are important roles
for the stakeholders. It is likely that if the stakeholders are (i) judges, prosecutors,
politicians, and law enforcement officers then they will have different priorities
than a group of stakeholders that includes (ii) public defenders, victims’ families,
and prisoner advocates. Again, even within an outcome reasoning situation there
are vital roles for the stakeholders.
Potential stakeholders can offer more fundamental critiques of the process out-
lined above; they can reject outcome reasoning. While the contest demonstrated
the ordering on the data in existence, the real question for the stakeholders is to
reason about deploying the algorithm in future, unseen data. In order to proceed
the stakeholders need to have a discussion of how they, as a group, believe the
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prediction problem they are interested in satisfies the MARA conditions. Given
the sensitivities around depriving citizens of their rights, it is likely that both
resiliency and agnosis are not satisfied for stakeholders like public defenders and
prisoner advocates. Additionally, when an individual is incarcerated, it is not pos-
sible to assess the validity of the algorithm’s prediction based on their outcome,
so for anyone incarcerated there is no measurement available.
Without recourse to MARA(s), given the relative prowess of the companies’
prediction algorithms – it may feel hard for stakeholders to articulate their con-
cerns and, further, to identify that outcome-reasoning should not be sufficient to
convince them given the concerns they have with the prediction problem. Fur-
ther, MARA(s) allows certain types of criticism to be clearer: (i) Company A’s
Type 3 black box is concerning because the stakeholders have strong beliefs such
as deonotological concerns that no one can reason about. It is likely Company A
needs to be disqualified. (ii) Company B’s Type 1 black box may allow people
within the company to reason about future functioning of the algorithm (if it is
an algorithm that they can model-reason about) but the reasoning is not being
done by the stakeholders and any assertions from Company B that the algorithm
is consistent with the stakeholder beliefs requires a level of trust and possible ver-
ification (i.e., social-psychological arguments). It needs to be clear that Company
B has not ”successfully” articulated a data-driven argument that can convince
stakeholders to the same level as Company C. Competing successfully in a CTF
event does not warrant deployment.
It is important for stakeholders to know, and have the language to hold oth-
ers accountable for, getting buy-in pre-deployment. This buy-in process centers
on understanding if the MARA conditions are satisfied. If the MARA are not
satisfied then stakeholders should request model-reasoning before deployment.
7. RELATED WORK
Recently the CTF, while continuing to yield huge success in algorithmic devel-
opment, has seen a host of criticisms. One concern about the CTF is that datasets
can be overfit over time (Sculley et al., 2018; Rogers, 2019; Van Calster et al.,
2019; Ghosh, 2019). Despite all attempts to protect against overfitting, idiosyn-
cratic aspects of a particular dataset are learned when heuristic improvements
yield improved predictions over the state of the art. Additionally, and a potential
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corollary of this criticism, given two sets of reference data, it is often unclear why
an algorithm performs well on one dataset, but poorly on the other. This has led
some to call for more resources to be dedicated to understanding the theoretical
underpinnings of the algorithms that have achieved such huge success, hoping to
avoid a catastrophic failure in the future. There have been several debates on the
relative merits of careful theoretical justification vs. rapid performance improve-
ment (see Rahimi and Recht (2017) and rebuttal in LeCun (2017); see also Barber
(2019)). We do not enter this debate here. However, the substance of the debate
is important in MARA(s). As can be seen in how these algorithms respond to
different datasets, their performance is a complex interaction of the data, which
can often be quite large, and difficult-to-uncover aspects of the algorithms. While
some in the aforementioned debates call for more theoretical understanding of
these algorithms ahead of rapid innovation, we take a different tack and ask
when we can deploy a black box algorithm through outcome-reasoning to make
predictions in the wild. For an algorithm whose future performance is justified
using a measurement of the algorithm’s success in the space of the outcome, as
is done in the CTF, this framework recognizes an extension to the CTF, at very
least satisfying the measurement problem-feature. In problems that do not sat-
isfy the measurement problem-feature, the algorithm is being used to extrapolate
without apriori justification, and we have no way of measuring – or perhaps even
being aware of – failures. By construction, such extrapolation does not exist in
the static version of the CTF.
This paper also relates to debates in ethical machine learning through both the
agnosis problem feature, as well as through stakeholder inclusion. This literature
is new, rapidly expanding, and impactful; we suggest interested readers consult
the following as solid entry points: Corbett-Davies and Goel (2018); Lum and
Isaac (2016); Kusner et al. (2017); Nabi and Shpitser (2018); Wiens et al. (2019).
We use the MARA(s) framework in the examples in Section 3 to demonstrate how
this framework can be used to clarify concerns of this nature – see the examples
on recidivism (subsection 3.4) and prediction in lieu of measurement (subsection
3.3).
In the public literature, most discussion of the CTF has been undertaken by
David Donoho (Donoho, 2017, 2019). (Note: it appears that much of the devel-
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opment of the CTF happened outside of the public-facing, academic literature.
See section 9) Of particular interest, Donoho develops the notion of hypothetical
reasoning in Donoho (2019), exploring how analysts have developed “models”
– formalizations of their beliefs into statements of probability models – to “...
genuinely allow us to go far beyond the surface appearance of data and, by so do-
ing, augment our intelligence.” Using language developed for MARA(s) we might
say that satisfying the agnosis problem-feature means forgoing the advantages
Donoho identifies accrue because of hypothetical reasoning. That may be a rea-
sonable choice in some settings, but it should give pause to researchers interested
in generating solid scientific evidence.
Finally, the MARA(s) framework is related to work on explainability/interpretability
of algorithms. The conversations on these topics have been happening for many
years, and in several distinct literatures, so understanding the foundational con-
cerns and identifying the through lines of thinking can be challenging. We di-
rect readers to two touchstone pieces in the literature as a good place to start:
Breiman (2001) and Shmueli et al. (2010). Cynthia Rudin (Rudin, 2018) explores
the suitability of two types of models, explainable machine learning models and
interpretable machine learning models, in the context of high risk and low risk
predictions. In Rudin’s dichotomy, she warns against using explainable models
in a high risk prediction due to our inability to make sense of the performance
of the model despite the promise of explanation. Instead, for high risk scenar-
ios, she urges the practitioners to use interpretable models that can be linked
directly to domain knowledge, and encourages researchers to put effort into find-
ing suitable interpretable models where none exist. In terms of our framework,
Rudin is exploring the joint impact of the resilience and agnosis problem-features.
We direct the reader to Rudin’s paper for details on why explainable machine
learning models are not sufficient for what we identify as problems that require
model-reasoning.
8. DISCUSSION
The MARA(s) framework focuses on features of the prediction problem at
hand, rather than the features of the algorithm. The problem itself is selected by
the stakeholders who have concerns that include accountability. Understanding
how stakeholders see the problem is the critical first step towards selecting an
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appropriate algorithm. This framework directs attention to the four problem-
features that stakeholders should assess: measurement, adaptability, resilience,
and agnosis (“MARA”). Once assessed, the appropriate method for reasoning
about the algorithm can be selected.
In contrast to (but not in conflict with) MARA(s), there are other frameworks
for decision-making about the suitability of an algorithm, technical in nature and
useful for understanding the performance of different algorithms – e.g. diagnostic
tools or asymptotic performance – but these are helpful after the method of
reasoning has been selected.
While MARA(s) is a statement about the problem and not the algorithm,
it does imply a loose structure to the set of possible algorithms. One way to
think about this implied structure is that model-reasoning methods are decou-
pled from the data, allowing for deductive reasoning about future performance,
while outcome-reasoning relies on contingent, inductive reasoning. Many of the
current approaches to describing black-box algorithms are inductive in nature
(see Rudin (2018)). While these can be quite useful, they are still a qualitatively
different form of reasoning. This is a familiar distinction in the type of evidence
we bring to problems, and the reader need not look hard to find examples in
which deductive reasoning is a required component of our decision making. The
gold-standard of inductive reasoning is randomized trials, but in the most con-
sequential settings, the result of the most solid form of inductive reasoning does
not provide sufficient justification. For example, when approving a new drug,
government agencies would not allow evidence from an atheoretical randomized
trial to warrant approval. Instead agencies require a detailed scientific hypothesis
about how the drug’s mechanism causes the outcome. The addition of deductive
reasoning and coherence across beliefs provides a firmer, evidence-based founda-
tion. And yet, when appropriate, the use of outcome-reasoning is to be preferred
because it is a powerful engine for producing the highest quality predictions.
Outcome-reasoning is the intellectual-engine of modern prediction algorithms.
If the data sets are interesting, the task is useful, and the performance metric
describes an ordering that matches how the algorithm will be used then outcome-
reasoning leads to an extraordinary consequence: it allows an analyst to bypass
the slow, technical challenge of mathematically describing the behavior of the
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algorithm. Instead, outcome-reasoning allows the analyst to look at the joint dis-
tribution of predicted and observed outcomes and then rank performance of al-
gorithms by creating statistical summaries. Outcome-reasoning leverages Tukeys
insight that (Tukey, 1986): “In a world in which the price of calculation continues
to decrease rapidly, but the price of theorem proving continues to hold steady
or increase, elementary economics indicates that we ought to spend a larger and
larger fraction of our time on calculation.”
The power and popularity of the CTF has inspired extensions to prediction
domains that are not traditionally investigated inside the framework. For instance
in Wikle et al. (2017) the authors propose an extension to spatial prediction
which, among other additions, includes an abundance of relevant data sets of
differing characteristics on which the algorithm must succeed, and additional
metrics, like assessment of prediction coverage. It seems reasonable that the CTF-
SP will enhance rapid innovation of algorithms for certain types of problems,
which is an exciting prospect for the spatial forecasting community. However, we
caution that, like all algorithms that are developed in the CTF, those algorithms
that are not qualified to be reasoned about using model-reasoning and should
only be used in a situation that permits outcome-reasoning.
The MARA(s) framework provides a language to help stakeholders and ana-
lysts communicate the key features of a problem and then guide the selection of an
appropriate algorithm. This language can also be used by algorithm developers to
help identify areas for innovation. For instance, in section 3 we discuss “prediction
in lieu of measurement” and we are unaware of effective algorithms that could be
used to provide model-reasoning. This provides analysts and stakeholders a way
to identify critical gaps in the existing set of approaches.
The unpredictable brittleness of black-box algorithms has provoked concern
and increased scrutiny. But black-box algorithms have had extraordinary success
in some settings. We are concerned that a desire to use these powerful algorithms
– combined with the facile strength of outcome-reasoning – has led to overconfi-
dence from non-technical stakeholders. In contrast, model-reasoning can be more
technically challenging to understand and has put limitations on the algorithms
that can be deployed. We think these limitations are important to recognize. It
has been hard to discuss these limitations because, for any given black-box al-
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gorithm, understanding why it might fail or when it might fail is challenging. In
contrast, understanding which settings are appropriate for black-box deployment
only requires understanding how they are developed – that is, using the Common
Task Framework (CTF). The MARA(s) framework extends the CTF into real-
world settings, by isolating four problem-features – measurement, adaptability,
resilience, and agnosis (“MARA”) – that mark a problem as being more or less
suitable for black-box algorithms. Further, we suggest that the compact notation
MARA(s) makes it clear how the assessment of the problem features is a function
of the stakeholders. We hope MARA(s) will help the two cultures of statistical
modeling – and our stakeholders – communicate and reason about algorithms.
9. CORRESPONDENCE WITH MARK LIBERMAN: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Mark Liberman agreed to read a draft of our paper. As part of his feedback, he
provided a historical perspective that is often downplayed in current discussions
of the CTF, but that can– as most accounts of history do– provide guidance on
how we might work inside the CTF to tackle new technical challenges (Liberman,
2020).
Liberman writes, “The [CTF] was developed as a way to manage and guide
sponsored research on very hard problems that were far away from practically
useful solutions – two or three decades away, as it turned out. It was NOT origi-
nally meant for the development and evaluation of real solutions to real problems,
though obviously it can be (and has been) generalized in that direction.” This
was intentional, and had implications on the choice of task and metric.
He says that “it was seen as a mistake to choose tasks that directly repre-
sent the real goal of the work.” Instead tasks were chosen that balanced several
requirements, including their fitness for the CTF (i.e. cost-effective data set cre-
ation); their isolation of specific, current challenges that were not trivial but also
not insurmountable; and their appeal to funders. “New tasks (or new versions of
old tasks) should be introduced every year or so ... in order to check generalization
and approach the real goal more closely.”
The same careful thinking applied to metrics. Liberman writes, “Again, it was
seen as a mistake to try to measure what you actually care about.” Instead,
metrics should be conceptually simple and easy to automate, and should serve
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to move research in the general direction of the ultimate goals– to this point,
he stresses, “it was always explicit that these metrics were at best somewhat
correlated with the (anyhow varied) research goals”. While tasks were to be
frequently updated or changed, “metrics should not be changed very often, though
new metrics need to be added from time to time as appropriate.” As examples of
useful metrics in human language technology (HLT), Liberman points to “word
error rate” and the BLEU metric (Papineni et al., 2002), that are flawed as metrics
for real-world applications, but have served HLT research well for several decades.
The key is to understand when each metric is useful in promoting progress towards
the ultimate goals of research, and when they are not. We note that this notion
of a task or method being useful, but not necessarily realistic for use in the
“real world”, should not seem unfamiliar, as it conjures George Box’s well-known
saying, “All models are wrong, but some are useful.”
Liberman adds, “The issues in question were discussed and debated extensively
in the period 1985-2005, and to a lesser extent since then.” In particular, the
choices of task and metric “need to be re-thought for shorter-term applications.”
The emergence of these shorter-term applications coincided with two important
shifts in research drivers: 1) the technologies had become “commercially viable,
so that a short-term outlook began to make sense”, and 2) “Support for R&D
in these areas shifted from the government to industry.” The second point in
particular has interesting implications on how the CTF is administered. Under
government funding, the CTF was intentional. Tasks and metrics were curated so
as to promote progress as intended by the CTF, and evaluation data sets guarded
by a third party. Today, in contrast, the CTF exists in flavors. Each flavor bears
resemblance to the original design of the CTF, though with some characteristics
modified or even entirely missing.
We mention in the introduction to this paper, for instance, that often an evalu-
ation data set is no longer maintained by a third party (of course, there are many
instances, like Kaggle competitions, where this is not the case). Much research
occurs in environments that rely on self-policing. The researcher will create their
own evaluation data set and hold their own bake-off between their current algo-
rithm and other algorithms. Indeed, every slight modification to an algorithm is
compared to a previous iteration through a process that mimics the CTF. On the
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other hand, in some competitions, aspects of the CTF competition culture might
be absent. This happens when a company creates a proprietary data set with the
intention of creating an algorithm to be released as a product. In this case, the
company might develop algorithms in a manner that mimics the CTF, with a
task, metric, labeled data set, and rapid empirical evaluation, but with no (or at
least minimal) competition from analysts outside of the company.
We believe that MARA(s) applies to all flavors of the CTF, with special focus
on the technologies close to deployment (Liberman refers to these as “shorter-
term”). We echo Liberman’s urging that the community think through the im-
plications that a deployment-focused CTF has on the tasks and metrics, as well
implications of the relaxation or omission of characteristics of the original, care-
fully planned CTF. Because the deployment-focused CTF is linked to the real-
world problem of interest, we stress that MARA(s) should be a cornerstone in
discussions.
In our original draft that we sent to Liberman, we used MARA(s) to explore the
HLT subdomain of chatbots, which try to engage a user in a natural, informative
conversation, in a narrowly defined setting. However, compared to the rapid in-
novation in many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, the development and
deployment of chatbots has been slow. Focusing on problem-first analysis using
MARA(s), it appears that the problem-feature of measurement might be difficult
to satisfy, since the space of possible responses in a conversation is vast. After all,
not only are there many ways to convey the same information, there are often
many plausible types of information that would be appropriate for a particular
response. But in the real world there is feedback on the predictions of a chatbot.
A useless chatbot might garner complaints, or conversation might be terminated
early. A cleverly designed deployment could test the utility of a chatbot on an
ongoing basis, serving as a proxy function to the actual measurement of interest.
Assuming the other MARA problem features are satisfied (which depends on the
problem of interest), then outcome-reasoning could be used.
The problem for chatbot development is that, because the space of possible
responses mentioned in the previous paragraph is vast, it is essentially impossi-
ble to curate a dataset for a static-CTF. Our analysis pointed to this as an odd
(though possibly not unusual) situation in which a problem is fit for outcome-
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reasoning, but cannot fully benefit from the friction-less environment and rapid
innovation promised by the traditional CTF. One interesting consequence of this
is that it might be possible to mimic characteristics of the CTF by creative early
deployment of chatbots. For instance (and we caution here that this is for illus-
tration purposes only as there are many issues we are ignoring that need to be
considered), an online marketplace, let’s call it “WHAMazon”, might be inter-
ested in using chatbots to help customers determine which product best suits
their needs in order to expand on the current service they offer that requires hu-
man helpers. In order to mimic the CTF through early deployment, WHAMazon
could invite (or entice with discounts) customers to interact with a chatbot for
two minutes in a way that reflects the customers needs at the time. Upfront, the
customer would know that this was for fun and not intended for informational
purposes. This would minimize customer frustration and potential abandonment,
while providing an endless amount of training data.
Given the nuanced history of the CTF that he provided, Liberman suggests
that there is a lack of effective choices of tasks and metrics that will lend them-
selves to rapid development. Adopting a development-focused (long-term) view,
rather than a deployment-focused (short-term) view might help to identify suit-
able choices. We agree with this assessment. Further, in the case where a com-
pany chooses the early-deployment strategy discussed above, the development-
focus CTF vs. deployment-focus CTF distinction should still affect the choice of
task and metric. For instance, in a development-focused CTF design (and very
much dependent on the current challenge being faced by the development team),
WHAMazon could set up a scenario in which the customer was incentivized to
identify, as early as possible in a conversation, if they were conversing with a chat-
bot or a human. In a deployment-focused CTF (once WHAMazon feels like they
are close to being able to deploy their chatbot technology), they might record if a
customer purchased an item after having chatted with the chatbot, or requested
to speak with a human after the 2 minute window had expired.
In the case of chatbots, MARA(s) suggests that the CTF is a worthwhile and
powerful paradigm for algorithmic development, while a careful understanding of
the history of the CTF suggests that the development-focused CTF is the ap-
propriate paradigm, at least for now. In order to harness the power of the CTF
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in as many domains as possible, we feel that a thorough understanding of the
history of the framework is essential. Careful thinking about the CTF and the
consequences of its development-focus and deployment-focus modes, combined
with the considerations of MARA(s), could bring to real-world challenges a prin-
cipled placement into the most effective and appropriate format for algorithm
development.
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